Introduction to Game Theory

Introduction to Game Theory
by Open Options Corporation - 2007

Summary:
Open Options Corporation defines Game Theory as "a branch of applied mathematics and economics that studies strategic situations where there are several stakeholders, each with different goals, whose actions can affect one another." According to the author, the benefit of conducting a Game Theory analysis is that it reveals the interactions of likely outcomes in situations where the end result is dependent on the actions of others, giving the analyst a better understanding of the situation and courses of action.

After a brief Game Theory history and credential check, Open Options discusses how Game Theory is applicable in business. Since the world of business focuses on competing against others with the goal of maximizing your own rewards, Game Theory is a natural fit to analyze possible business strategies.
"However, real business decisions have significant complications that are often ignored by abstract, academic game theory":

1. Real business decisions almost always have many players, a challenge for classical game theory.
   
2. Complex relationships among the players sometimes exist (i.e. some common and some competing issues exist between players).
   
3. Business outcomes are often not easy to reduce to a common measure for value such as dollars or expected utility. Rather, strategic interests, long term relationships and the personal goals of the CEO or founder can be critically influential.

Other advanced Game Theory options exist to help model and solve complexities within business strategies, these include: n-player, non-cooperative, nonzero-sum, non-simultaneous, asymmetric, & ordinal game theories.

Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict

Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict
Brightman, Hank J. 2007. "Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 3: 35-41. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed April 20, 2009).

* Actual article was accessed through Mercyhurst College's EBSCOhost subscription - link to article was found as a Google cached site.

Summary:
The 2007 article written by Dr. Hank Brightman, an associate Criminal Justice professor at Saint Peter's College and a USN Information Warfare Officer at the US Naval War College's War Gaming Department, posits that game theory suggests that US and Coalition forces stationed in Iraq will suffer an increasing rate of casualties the longer they remain in Iraq. The reasoning behind this statement is that both Domestic Insurgents (DI) and Indigenous Security Forces (ISF) will "turn away from attacking each other towards a point of mathematical corruption." It is at this theoretical point that US and Coalition forces will be the target of ISF intelligence-fed DI attacks. ISF refers to Iraqi military as well as state and local police; DI refers to various domestic insurgent groups within Iraq.

Brightman reviews the "prisoner's dilemma" and zero-sum game theory, and states that the prisoner's dilemma is an example of a simple form game (SFG). SFGs have two players that strive for the highest payoff at the end of a move or event (known as the Pareto Optimal position). As SFG applies to the Iraqi conflict, ISFs and DIs are the two players.
Extensive Form Games (EFG) are more complex than SFGs as they feature two or more players that are engaged in move-for-move exchanges, leaving the players less concerned with intermediate payoffs and focused on the ultimate payoff. EFGs are typically not zero-sum games and are distinguished by multiple moves, leaving players not only focused on broad strategy, but also smaller sub-strategies that counter the other players' moves. However, as time progresses in EFGs, the model becomes susceptible to "strange attractors" that "affect the players' willingness to adhere to previously stated rules and therefore decrease the overall stability of the game." US and Coalition forces would be considered strange actors in both the SFG and EFG models.

As time elapses the players (ISF & DI) become more frustrated and ultimately begin to reduce their expectation for the ultimate payoff. As this happens, each player considers negotiating with the opponent as a means of reducing losses - this is known as bargaining toward equilibrium, or a Pareto Improvement). "When both players have reached a point at which they can achieve the highest aggregate payoff, the game ends in preferred equilibrium."

"However, the influence of strange attractors in a model that will become increasingly unstable (bifurcated) over time often induces the players to hasten their desire for a Pareto Improvement position instead of a superior (Pareto Optimal) position - even though doing so may lessen their ultimate payoff." The strange attractors cause frustration which preempts the players from achieving the preferred equilibrium (the point in the prisoner's dilemma where both prisoners remain silent and gain the most) and instead yield the inchoate or Nash equilibrium (the point in the prisoner's dilemma where both prisoners confess to the crime).

*Author's note: the article delves further into the SFG and EFG situations as they relate to the Iraq Conflict, however, due to length they have been cut from this summary.

Exploring The Structure Of Terrorist WMD Decisions: A Game Theory Approach

Raymond E Franck & Francois Melese
Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 4, pp355-372, December 2004

Franck and Melese begin the article by breaking terrorist groups into two categories, political and fanatic. Regardless of the category the goals of a terrorist operation are to "damagea target government and influence a target audience." Terrorist organizations that fall into the fanatics category are more likely to view inflicting damage as a main objective, as oppose to influencing a target audience. Therefore they are more likely to be attracted to using WMDs.

When applying game theory, the authors' model is a set of four stages or "moves." The first move is from the terrorists and involves making a decision between acquiring WMD or staying with conventional weapons. The arguments for acquiring a WMD depend on the certainty of inflicting mass casualties, damaging the target government, and influencing the target audience. The arguments against acquiring a WMD are the costs, and increase in vulnerability to government counter-terrorism efforts. The second move is the decision of a target government to counter a potential WMD attack with "defensive" or "disruptive" measures. In the third move the ball in back in the terrorist's court over whether to carry out an attack with a WMD.




















The final move is not from governments or terrorists but "chance." The authors lay out four possible outcomes.

• ineffective operation (i.e., failure to achieve intended damage and casualties);
• effective operation which impresses the audience;
• effective operation which alienates the audience; and an
• effective operation that has a neutral effect on the audience.

In the second diagram the authors demonstrate how the probabilities of the different outcomes can depend on availability and use of WMD or conventional weapons and the government's use of defensive or disruptive countermeasures.

What follows are two tables that show the function of a player's decision. Table 1a shows probabilities that an attack will be effective and Table 1B shows probabilities of whether the attack will have its intended effect on its target audience. The variables presented in the tables are used in equations for the game to give governments an idea of whether they should invest in defensive or disruptive counter-measures.

The authors conclude that political terrorist groups even if they possess a WMD are less likely to use it than fanatic groups for fear of alienating their target audience. The kind of counter-measures a government utilizes is also a major factor in whether terrorists would pursue the WMD option or not. If terrorist feel that disruptive operations against them are too effective then they may be encouraged to carry out more conventional attacks.

Game Theory

The New School: History Of Economic Thought (HET) Website

According to HET Game Theory developed as a method for examining economic decision making. The theory was first organized by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's joint 1944 publication, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game Theory is where decisions about strategy are based on actions of other agents or adversaries.

The theory was updated by John Nash in 1950, with the "Nash Equilibrium." The Nash Equilibrium happens when all players produce the best responses to the actions of other players. According to HET, the concept of the Nash Equilibrium can be traced back to French Economist Augustin Cournot in 1838 The first textbook on game theory was published in 1957 by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. In the textbook Luce and Raiffa perfected the "Iterated Elimination of Dominated Stratgies (IEDS) for Strategic Normal Games" and the concept of "Repeated Game." Other game theorists in the 1950s and 1960s were H.W. Kuhn with games with "imperfect information" (i.e. players do not know the previous moves of other players); William Vickery with Auctions; Reinhard Selten with "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium" that uses backward induction; and Lloyd Shapely with the "Shapley Value."

The HET goes on to explain how "Evolutionary game theory" developed later and was designed to explain the results from what appeared to be cooperation between human institutions. Strategist Thomas C. Schelling argued that what appeared to be cooperation of social institutions in settling conflicst are actually maintained with threats of retaliation and punishment. HET then lists Nobel Laureates for Game Theory such as Nash, Selten, and Vickery.

Game theory, simulated interaction, and unaided judgement for forecasting decisions in conflicts: Further evidence

Kesten C. Green

Summary
Green's article, published in the International Journal of Forcasting (2005), is a validity study that compares the accuracy of game theory, simulated interactions (role playing), and unaided judgment as methods in forecasting decisions in conflicts. It provides further evidence to support his earlier research, which indicated that expert game theorists' forecasts had less accuracy than those of novice (student) role players.

It is important to note here that these methods were tested in experiments involving specific conflict situations only. Not all game theorists recommend game theory for generating forecasts in specific situations.

Green's 2002 study reflected the accuracy of the three methods for forecasting conflict decisions. Participants in the study were asked to select the most likely decision (in 5 conflict situations) from a list. The results of the study did not bode well for the game theory experts (participants, % accuracy):

• University Students (using unaided judgment), 27%
• Game Theory Experts, 28%
• University Students (using role playing/simulated interactions), 61%

Green's 2002 study drew some attention from his peers and game theorists, who commented that perhaps some conflict situations are more appropriate for use with game theory than others. The 2005 study utilized the same basic process, and was administered to participants representing the aforementioned three methods. It was directed at three (actual) conflicts, unrelated to the five used in the 2002 study:

1. Personal Grievance. An employee of a New Zealand student association felt there was a disparity between her work and the level of pay she was receiving. Upon the administration's evaluation of her situation, it was discovered that she was being compensated above the top-level of pay in her salary bracket. While her manager did not consider cutting her salary, she did arrange for a mediator to set up a meeting between the parties, as it was obvious she would not be elligible for a pay increase in the near future. Participants were to choose from several decisions.
2. Telco Takeover. This situation presented the participants with the conflict stemming from a corporate takeover battle between Alltel and CenturyTel. In 2001, executives from the much smaller CenturyTel company presented an offer that involved the sale of their mobile phone division to Alltel, which Alltel declined. Soon after, Alltel returned to CenturyTel with an offer to buy all of the company at 40% more than the share price. The board of CenturyTel fought to prevent an Alltel takeover. Participants were to forecast the execution of the deal and predict the basis of terms.
3. Water Dispute. This conflict raged over Syria's and Iraq's claims to access of the Euphrates River in 1975. The flow of water into Iraq had been slowed following Syria's construction of a dam across the Euphrates to create a reservoir in Syria. Both sides mobilized for war, and Saudi Arabia called both parties together for mediation. Participants in the study were to forecast whether Syria would increase water flow from the dam or whether Iraq would declare war and bomb Syria's dam.

Since the findings of this research were to be compared with those of the 2002 study, Green took steps to evenly match the conflict situations with game theorists' and other decision makers' interests, i.e. types of organizations involved, nature of the disputes, and familiarity of situations.

Results
The findings of this follow-up study are entirely consistent with the 2002 study. Game theory experts and unaided novices had a much lower forecast accuracy than novices who implemented role playing (simulated interactions) in predicting the eight conflict decisions.

Three predictions on the future of Iran, and the math to back it up

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
Lecture, TED Video

Summary

The basis of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's TED Talk is to apply the game theory approach to the question: What is Iran likely to do in the next couple years? In order to attempt to predict complex questions such as this, he insists that we (analysts) science instead of continuing to rely on "seat-of-the-pants wisdom". This type of analysis and its resulting prediction can be used in most types of complex negotiations and conflicts, or any situation involving coercion. It has applications in business mergers, environmental policy, education, litigation, politics, etc.

Game theory is a branch of mathematics. It makes three key assumptions about people:

1. People seek what is best for them ("rationally self-interested)
2. People have a set system of beliefs and values
3. People face limitations.

Since all people are rational and always tend to act in their own best interests (with the exception of 2 year-olds and schizophrenics), this tool can be applied to most any individual (even terrorists).

The first step is to consider who the people are who influence a rational person into believing that something (a change in policy, a position, belief, etc.) is in their own best interests. Presidents, for example, surround themselves with advisers, who in turn surround themselves with their own advisers, creating a pyramid of influence. Since many people go into the process of shaping a decision, we must pay attention to all of the actors.

At first glance, this may seem like a relatively simple task, considering the small number of cabinet-level advisers privy to the president. However, using simple math factorials, we see there are 120 interaction linkages between just one person and four of her advisers.

1. 

Once we double the number of decision makers to 10, we are left with the staggering number 10!, or 3.6 million linkage interactions. Obviously computers are an invaluable part of this type of analysis.At this point, there are several main things that one needs to know in order to conduct this analysis:

• Who are the players that have a stake in the outcome?
• What do they say they want?
• How focused are they on the problem at hand?
• How much influence do they have on the decision maker; how much clout?

In shaping policy, all people care about two main things: the outcome and receiving credit for their work. De Mesquita points out that most people fall between the outcome and the credit, and if we know to what extent they lean, we can influence their behavior. This leads us to determine what are their choices, values, chances they are willing to take, and their beliefs about other people. This information can be gathered from the Internet, news sources, and experts.

History is not relevant to this type of analysis. The computer does not factor for history and past actions (history is of little importance to de Mesquita, who refers to the Westerfield publication from Yale University Press that cites a declassified CIA study indicating that 90% of the time models were right even when the experts were not).

In applying the method to the question of Iran, de Mesquita focused the analysis on making 3 predictions:

1. What is Iran likely to do about nuclear weapons?
2. What is in store for the theocratic regime?
3. What does the future look like for Ahmadinejad?

The image below reflects the dynamics of interaction within Iran. The lines indicate the most likely level of aggresiveness in Iran's nuclear weapons development. The white line indicates the likely course if Iran were to be left to its own devices, removing the international influences and pressure.

The equilibrium is when the government of Iran will acheive its nationalist pride by making weapons grade fuel, but will stop short of obtaining enough to build a bomb.

The final image shows the computer-generated results for the projected winners and losers in Iranian politics. The obvious winners are the moneyed interests (whose influence is likely to get stronger with the state of the financial crisis). The "quietists" are likely to gain political clout as they perceive Iran moving politically in the wrong direction. It also appears that Ahmadinejad is the ultimate loser, as his already low influence continues to wane.

Comment: While Bruce Bueno de Mesquita offers here an interesting presentation and some interesting charts to advocate game theory, he provides little to no information about the actual process of his methodology.

What Is Game Theory And What Are Some Of Its Applications?

Saul I. Gass
Professor emeritus at the University of Maryland

Summary
After learning how to play the game tick-tack-toe, players typically discover a strategy of play that enables them to achieve at least a draw and potentially a win if the opponent makes a mistake. Sticking to that strategy ensures that the player will not lose. This illustrates the essential aspects of game theory.

Games with perfect information, such as tick-tack-toe, allow for the development of a pure strategy, an overall plan specifying moves to be taken in all eventualities that can arise. Games without perfect information (e.g. poker), however, offer a challenge because there is no pure strategy that ensures a win.

Players of games with imperfect information must then reconcile the questions: What is the optimal mix of strategies to play? How much do I expect to win?

Players must seek an equilibrium solution or a mixed set of strategies for each player, so that each player has no reason to deviate from that strategy, assuming all other players stick to their equilibrium strategy. This then creates the important generalization of a solution for game theory. All many-person non-cooperative finite strategy games have at least one equilibrium solution.

It is important to note, however, that for many competitive situations, game theory does not really solve the problem. Rather, game theory helps to illuminate the problem and offers players a different way of interpreting the competitive interactions and possible results. Game theory is a standard tool of analysis for professionals working the fields of operations research, economics, regulation, military, retail marketing, politics, conflict analysis, and many more.

Specific real-world situations include missile defense, sale price wars, NASCAR racing, military conflicts, conflict resolution, the stock market, telecommunications, elections and voting, and arbitration to name a few.

What Is Game Theory

David K. Levine
Department of Economics, UCLA

Summary
Game theory provides a simple representation of a variety of important situations. There are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and noncooperative game theory. David Levine of UCLA defines noncooperative game theory as “dealing largely with how intelligence individuals interact with one another in an effort to achieve their own goals.” Noncooperative game theory is the subject of Levine’s article. (Note: Levine does not define cooperative game theory).

One way to approach a noncooperative game is to list the players and their respective alternative choices (called actions or strategies) available. Consider for example the game Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the case of this two-player game, the actions of one player form the rows of a matrix while the opposing player’s actions from the columns. The entries into the matrix represent the utility or payoff to the two players. (Note: Levine does not discuss how he derived the values).

Higher numbers represent higher values in utility. If neither suspect confesses, both prisoners (or players) go free and split the proceeds of their crime (represented by a value of 5). If one player confesses and the other does not, however, the prisoner who confesses testifies against the other in exchange for going free and gets the entire value of 10 utility points; while the other player who did not confess goes to prison, resulting in the low utility score of -4. If both prisoners confess, then both are given a reduced term, but are convicted, which is represented by a utility value of 1.

An intelligent player of the game should quickly understand that no what he/she believes that his/her opponent will do, it is always better to confess. If the partner in the other cell is not confessing, it is possible to get a 10 instead of a 5. If the partner in the other cell is confessing, it is possible to get a 1 instead of a -4.

Author's Note: Levine offers a second example in which he examines the question, ""If we were all better people the world would be a better place." Although the discussion was interesting (Levine disproves the statement), the discussion was not helpful in understanding the dynamics of game theory.

Game Theory

M. Shane Smith

Summary:
According to the author, "Game theory provides analytical tools for examining strategic interactions among two or more participants." By using game theory, analysts can gain insight into social relations between individuals and, by extension, states. Individuals and state actors are trying to fulfill goals that provide them with the best possible outcome, however the best possible outcome for one actor may be the worst for another; thus game theory is a tool that can be used to develop strategies to be applied when dealing with multiple actors who have multiple interests. "Just as we may be able to understand the strategy of players in a particular game, we may also be able to predict how people, political factions, or states will behave in a given situation."

Five elements of game theory as an analytic tool are highlighted:

1. players, or decision makers;
2. strategies available to each player;
3. rules governing players' behavior;
4. outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices made by players at a given point in the game; and
5. payoffs accrued by each player as a result of each possible outcome.

Game theory assumes that each player will pursue a course that brings them the greatest reward, and that by cooperating with other players, everyone can reach a mutually beneficial outcome. This is not always the case, however, as mutual distrust may hinder the advancement of beneficial interests and interfere with cooperation. This may send actors down a path that leads to a mutually destructive outcome. The author provides the example of the US vs USSR during the Cold War:
"For example, deterrence theory has guided U.S. defense strategy since the end of World War II. It assumes that a credible and significant threat of retaliation can curb an aggressor's behavior; if an individual believes that aggressive behavior may trigger an unacceptable and violent response from others, he or she is less likely to behave aggressively. The threat of reprisal does not directly reduce the probability of violence; instead, the perceived benefit of aggressive behavior decreases, in the face of probable retaliation. If two individuals recognize that their best interests lie in avoiding each other's retaliation, neither is likely to initiate hostilities. This was the guiding principle behind U.S.-Soviet relations during much of the Cold War."
Ultimately both sides cooperated to come to a mutually beneficial outcome; however, had serious distrust led to each side independently pursuing what was best for them, the conclusion may have been nuclear annihilation for both.

The use of game theory allows us to identify both best case scenarios, as well as worse case scenarios, and pursue a path that is mutually beneficial to all actors. "Since games often reflect or share characteristics with real situations -- especially competitive or cooperative situations -- they can suggest strategies for dealing with such circumstances."

Terrorism & Game Theory

Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M., Simulation Gaming 2003; 34; 319

Summary:
The authors postulate that game theory is a useful tool to analyze both the actions of terrorists and a government's response to terrorism. Terrorists respond to how governments respond to them, and vice versa; thus by using game theory to study terrorism, the analyst may be able to come to some conclusions as to which actions are appropriate for a government to take to mitigate the threat of terrorism.

The article highlights 6 reasons why game theory is appropriate to the study of terrorism:

1. Game theory captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and a targeted government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot be analyzed as though one side is passive.
2. Strategic interactions among rational actors, who are trying to act according to how they think their counterparts will act and react, characterize the interface among terrorists (hardliners vs. moderates) or among alternative targets (various governments).
3. In terrorist situations, each side issues threats and promises to gain a strategic advantage.
4. Terrorists and governments abide by the underlying rationality assumption of game theory, where a player maximizes a goal subject to constraints.
5. Game-theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations and terrorist campaign-induced negotiations over demands.
6. Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are not completely informed.

As an example of using game theory to re-assess a governments policy towards terrorism, the article investigates the usefulness of the "no-negotiation" policy. The logic of the no-negotiation policy is that terrorists will not take hostages if there is nothing to gain from the undertaking, i.e. a government will not concede to their demands. By using game theory to develop a model of this policy, however, it becomes quickly apparent that the policy is of little value in deterring terrorists. Terrorists may still perceive the taking of hostages as beneficial to them for a variety of reasons, "If a sufficiently important person is secured, then the government may regret its no-negotiation pledge because the expected costs of not capitulating may exceed that of capitulating...Even when the government's pledge not to negotiate is believed by the terrorists, a fanatical group may still engage in a hostage mission when a positive payoff is associated with either a logistical or negotiation failure by advertising the cause or achieving martyrdom...The effectiveness of the no-negotiation policy hinges on the credibility of the government's pledge, the absence of incomplete information, the terrorists' gains being solely tied to a negotiation success, and sufficient deterrence spending to eliminate logistical success."

Game theory also exposes a paradox in the cooperation of governments in response to terrorism. "Although the US is the target of approximately 40% of all transnational terrorist attacks, virtually all of these attacks occurred abroad in recent years [prior to 2003], with 9/11 being a noticeable exception. US over deterrence means that it experiences attacks where it has little authority to do anything about them." Also highlighted is the seemingly contradictory effect that as nations share intelligence on terrorists to increase deterrence, they in fact "transfer the attacks abroad." By not sharing intelligence AND coordinating deterrence, nations "waste resources without necessarily increasing security."

Ultimately, game theory exposes flaws in policies that may not deter terrorist attacks as well as initially perceived By addressing these flaws, decision-makers can make their respective counterterrorism policies more effective.

Authors Comment: This article recommends game theory as a tool to reassess policy, which is not the role of the intelligence analyst. However, by using game theory in tandem with a knowledge of our own policies towards terrorism, the intelligence analyst may be able to better forecast where an attack is likely to occur (whether at home or abroad), the modus operandi of the attack, and perhaps what terrorists are trying to achieve. According to game theory, terrorists will always seek the highest payoffs for them, and thus the analyst can seek to identify these payoffs, how they are likely to be achieved, and inform the decision maker as to how to best prevent their achievement.

Summary Of Findings: Red Teaming (2 Stars Out Of 5)

Note: This post represents the synthesis of the thoughts, procedures and experiences of others as represented in the 12 articles read in advance of (see previous posts) and the discussion among the students and instructor during the Advanced Analytic Techniques class at Mercyhurst College on 15 APR 2009 regarding Red Teaming specifically. This technique was evaluated based on its overall validity, simplicity, flexibility and its ability to effectively use unstructured data.

Description:
Red Teaming is an analytical modifier that can be used in two distinct ways:
First, in an objective sense, it is used to challenge emerging operational concepts in order to discover weaknesses with an organization's procedures and reactions.
Second, in a subjective sense, red teaming is used to generate options for adversaries that may be overlooked due to biases or heuristics.
When red teaming is used in the first manner, the effectiveness of red teaming is usually easier to monitor and evaluate. When using the second approach, it is more difficult to measure the effectiveness of red teaming, as the effectiveness is subject to forces outside of the method itself.

Strengths:
*Forces "thinking outside the box"

*Challenges "groupthink"; may reduce bias

*Can provide invaluable near-real world training (as close to real world as possible)

*Can identify previously unknown threats and gaps in security

*Can provide a diverse outlook on a problem

*Can identify new uses for innovations

Weaknesses:
*No textbook way to conduct red teaming

*Can verge on science fiction

*Red Team can be marginalized

*Results can be ignored by SME if non-SME conduct the exercise

*Red Team may pursue path of least resistance and not take the excercise seriously

*Participants must fully understand culture of the Red Team they are playing to make the most of the excercise

*Requires leadership committed to making changes based on the recommendations of the Red Team

*Memebers of the Red Team may be of a poor quality and thus negate the usefullness of the exercise

*May be used to politicize intelligence ( see The Power of Nightmares)

*No particular guidance on how many team members are needed to function optimally

*Does not always allow creativity

*Excercise can be stifled by rules and parameters set up to "prove a point"

*Can be subject to "groupthink" within the Red Team

How To:
**A hodgpodge of instructions exist on how to conduct red teaming exercises. The "How To" is largely dependent upon the type or form of red teaming being executed.

1)Populate team (can be composed of subject experts or outside consultants chosen for other unique skills/qualities)
2)Receive tasking or objective from management
3)Assume the role assigned with particular consideration of the limitations imposed on the team (cultural, technological, equipment, etc.)
4)Provide the red team with the necessary independance and credibility to challenge existing norms and ideas and suggest "outside the box" ideas.
5) Execute tasking or exercise.
6)Disseminate and if necessary advocate the key findings to the person excercising control over both the red and blue teams.

Experience:
In order to gain a better understanding of the process of red teaming, the group played a conflict simulation game, "Strike Force One". The game is a simple computer-based simluation used to recreate a combat situation in a key area of West Germany during the Cold War. One player, in this case the computer (AI), advances as the Soviet Army, and the human user takes the role of US Army forces defending key towns on the grid. Movement takes place on a board of "hexes" and the result of the combat is determined by simulated die rolls, as any common combat board game. The group "red teamed" the anticipated movements of the enemy forces, but was ultimately defeated by the Soviets.

Here are some of our experiences:

*Team members dissented over the most likely movements of advesaries - illustrating the multitude of options available for these adversaries.

*Relatively easy to anticipate the adversary's general movements, but more difficult to anticipate which specific move he would choose; but combat results are not entirely predictable.

*Team still had the US Army's interests in mind; not able to fully think like the adversary.

Red Teams: An Audit Tool, Technique and Methodology for Information Assurance

http://www.isaca.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=30762&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
by Frederick Gallegos & Matthew L. Smith

With businesses and organizations increasingly dependent on information systems in everyday practice, a large responsibility is placed on the involved organizations and government legislation to ensure the safety and security of private customer information. This publication seeks to address the growing risks threatening information security, by employing the tactic of red teaming.

Red teaming is a valuable tool for information security auditors to directly identify new and emerging security threats within an organization, allowing them to provide evidence to support modifying that organization's security system and practices. This article describes the use of "white-hat hackers" to infiltrate the system, exposing and exploiting system vulnerabilities for the purpose of developing actionable evidence for system modifications. It is important that these individuals are obtained externally, so they have no pre-existing knowledge of the organization's network and its security infrastructure. Employing external , uninformed individuals to execute this "test" is a good way to obtain unbiased evidence of system weaknesses.

The red team should be made up of SMEs well-versed in computer forensics. In an IS red teaming exercise, the team will test four main areas of an information system: operating system/platform security, networks/communications; applications/decision processes; policies, passwords, permissions. Additionally, a training path should be developed for the red team members, and they should provide a record of observations and practices in a database for other team members to share.

Case Study: Red Teaming Iran's Supreme Leader

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18216/case_study.html
by Graham Allison

This article is the memorandum for a case study used in Graham Allison's class, "Central Challenges of America's Foreign Policy ". The memorandum used in this case study requires students to "red team", or to assume the role of an adversary.

Summary
This case study focuses on the December 2007 NIE regarding the projected status of Iran's nuclear program. The scenario is this: National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, tasked with assessing Iran's future goals and strategy, has asked his analysts to approach the question by assuming the role of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his advisers in evaluating their options.

To maximize the efficiency of the analysis, Hadley has (hypothetically) tasked each of his red teams with a slightly different job. In this case, the analyst is to assume that Khamenei has decided to pursue nuclear weapons and that he is actively seeking to acquire three or more nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time (by December 2009), without provoking other countries, prompting an attack on its nuclear weapons program. The assignment is to provide the National Security Adviser with a "red team" memo providing three strategy options that the Supreme Leader may likely choose.

Analysts are to place themselves in the position of an Iranian foreign policy expert and close adviser to Khamenei, operating under his previously articulated top national interests:

1. Survival of the regime as an Islamic republic with its fundamental institutions and values intact;

2. The stability of Iran and its territorial integrity;

3. Prevention of a military attack upon Iran;

4. The enhancement of Iran's power, first within the region, and in time beyond.

Reflections of a Red Team Leader

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/Craig.pdf
by Susan Craig

Summary:

This article focuses on the military aspects of red team leadership and characteristics commonly found in leaders of red team groups. The author suggests these traits will help any person in an organization think more critically of the environment the decision will be implemented in.

Legislation was enacted to implement red teams to prevent "failures of imagination and critical thinking apparent in the wake of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq." According to Craig the most important aspect of being a red-teamer is the ability to ask good questions. Those questions should not alienate, but rather stimulate thought and point out assumptions or factors not being addressed. A red team should also identify poor measures of effectiveness and think about better indicators for feedback.

Specifically in terms of the military application of red-teaming the leader needs to consider coalition partner's constraints, capabilities, and political will, as well as their shared opponents.

Craig believes the understanding of cultural idiosyncrasies is forefront to leading a red team. Especially important is the understanding of formal and informal economies; sociological political and religious systems; sociolinguistics; semiotics; and its concept of violence.

More generally applied lessons from leading red teams is espoused upon by Craig. First, the red team should act more as a historian than an analyst (focusing on broad questions as opposed to a very specific question). Red team's insights should be tailored to the audience it addresses. The red team should be as diverse as possible. The implementation of red team recommendations needs leadership committed to making changes to the original plan. The red team leader should possess the abilities to advocate and persuade.

Red Teams: Toward Radical Innovation

http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/imc/pdf/gt510-6190-red-teams.pdf

Summary:

This executive technology report was produced by IBM and therefore represents a competitive intelligence aspect of red-team analysis.

The executive summary of the report summarizes the main points the best:

Red teams assume the role of outsider to challenge assumptions, look for the unexpected alternatives and find the vulnerabilities of a new idea or approach. By consciously working to assume another perspective and out-do the standard team, they provide one means to getting "out-of-the-box" views and insights.

The report also lists a number of key benefits of a red team:

• Identify significant vulnerabilities
• Discover new uses for innovations
• Challenge taboos and assumptions
• Provide a minority report on a new concept or idea
• Reveal the consequences of different perspectives

Red teams impact all three levels of planning (strategic, tactical, operational). To have any impact the red team must have a proper composition, have the support of management, have an operational relationship with the blue team, have established goals, and have access to most of the information of the blue team.

The report does outline some drawbacks from using a red team approach. The red team needs to take their assignment seriously. At times the red team was marginalized by the red team. Team membership quality lacked to fully exploit the role of adversary. Also, red teams did not receive enough credible information to act appropriately.

The Power Of Nightmares

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2798679275960015727&ei=B0bjSdHbFoLorgKzq7CmAw&q=power+of+nightmares&hl=en

Summary
The Power of Nightmares is a three hour documentary by BBC producer Adam Curtis. The purpose of the film is to compare the evolution of the neo-conservatives and the Islamist movement that gave birth to Al-Qaeda. A small segment in the first hour gives a great example of how Red Team or Team B analysis can be misused.

About 25 minutes into the first hour the documentary talks about the Team B unit during the Ford Administration the Neo-cons allied themselves with Rumsfeld who was Secretary of Defense and Dick Cheney who was Chief of Staff. At 26 minutes the film shows Rumsfeld making a speech about how the Soviets were expanding the volume and capabilities of their weapons systems. The narration then goes on to explain how at that time intelligence produced by the CIA was indicating the opposite of Rumsfeld’s assertions. Rumsfeld convinced President Ford to set-up an "independent inquiry" to look at the intelligence and prove that Soviet weapons and capabilities were expanding. The inquiry was a group of Neo-cons whose memebers included Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Pipes. The Inquiry was called "Team B." Its function was to be a group of outside experts to look at all the information possessed by the CIA and see if the outside experts come to the same conclusions as CIA.

After not being able to find evidence of advanced Soviet weapons systems Team B concluded that the Soviets were hiding their new weapons systems. The film gives an example of how Team B could not find evidence that the Soviets had an acoustic defense system for their submarine forces. Team B interpreted this as meaning that the Soviets had a more advanced undectable non-acoustic system, and therefore would have a significant advantage in submarine warfare.

The CIA believed that Soviet Air Defense systems were not advancing. To prove the CIA wrong Team B relied on the Soviet Air Defense training manual that said Soviet Air Defenses were totally functional and advancing. Team B was also accused of looking at satelite imagery of Soviet radar and saying that those radars were really laser beam weapons system and mistranslating Russian documents to say "conquest" instead of "winning." According to an interview in the film with Dr. Anne Cahn who was with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977-1980, all of Team B's estimates were proven to be false.

Author's Note: In the introduction to Power of Nightmares, the narrator makes the assertion that political leaders in recent history have shifted from trying to win the favor of the populations they govern, from giving them promises of a better life to scaring them into supporting the leaders who they believe will protect them. This is the danger of Red Team/Team B analysis. If intelligence professionals provide decision makers with analytical products that indicate a low level of threat, decision makers will political ambitions can assign a Red Team to create a "nightmare" to scare populations into supporting their policies.

To Battle Groupthink, the Army Trains a Skeptics Corps

http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/05/15/the-army-trains-a-skeptics-corps-to-battle-groupthink.html

Summary

This article describes how the U.S. Army is training a group of officers to be skeptical of the current thinking in the military. The Red Team officers train at Fort Leavenworth's University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies. The program there has earned the nickname "Red Team University." The biggest challenge for Red Teamers is overcoming the stigma that their job is merely to try to war game and second guess operations planning. Graduates of the program were denied security badges on their first deployment to Iraq because soldiers were afraid they would hack into data bases for war gaming purposes. The commander of the first team in Iraq describes the akward feeling of having to always disagree with the group. The article goes on to explain how constant skepticism goes against basic military culture. When a leader is put in command it is important for the troops to have full confidence in him. Therefore it is important for Red Team members to know the time and place to question operational planning. Pushing too hard can hold up the decision making process, and further stigmatize the Red Team as obstructionists.

Another up-hill battle the Red Team faces is that most of them are from the Texas National Guard. This results in another stigma of them being part-time soldiers and therefore not qualified to second guess decisions of full time professional soldiers.

The "Red Team": Forging A Well-Conceived Contigency Plan

By Col. Timothy G. Malone and Maj. Reagan E. Schaupp
Aerospace Power Journal
Summer, 2002

Author's Note: Due to the article's length, only the most relevant information for our class was summarized.

Summary
Throughout the article, the authors provide two separate definitions for red teaming. Although the definitions are similar, they are also different (which is somewhat puzzling). I synthesized the two definitions and came up with this: a red team is a group of subject-matter experts with appropriate backgrounds that provide an independent review of processes and products using devil’s advocacy and knowledgeable role-playing of the enemy. The red team assesses planning decisions, assumptions, and courses of action from the perspective of friendly and enemy organizations.

The authors acknowledge that the concept of red teaming is far from new. Government, military, and civilian circles have all used red teaming in a variety of contexts. In government circles, it normally is associated with assessing the vulnerabilities of systems or structures, especially within the warfare arena. In the business world, red teaming usually refers to a peer review of a concept or proposal.

If conducted effectively, red teaming can produce more complete analysis at all phases and deliver a better plan of operations for the decision-maker. Effective red teams can pinpoint planning shortfalls, deviations from doctrine, reveal overlooked opportunities, and extrapolate unanticipated strategic implications. Additionally, red teaming can also determine whether the required task is understood or whether further guidance is needed.

Because a red team will conduct a comprehensive review planning products and processes, the selection of team members is critical. Red team members must have credibility, which comes only with expertise and experience. If some red team members blatantly fall short of this prerequisite, their counterparts will be skeptical of any insights they claim to have about the operation. The timing of red teaming events can play a crucial role in planning success. Ideally, the commander should form a red team as early in the planning effort as possible.

Red Teaming Revisited

Homeland Security Weekly

Summary:
This article takes a look at Red Teaming from the perspective of countering terrorism. According to Homeland Security Weekly, "It takes a thief to catch a thief. This is the Red Team Philosophy." There is a fine line, however, between creating a realistic scenario of value to the Intelligence Community (IC) and writing science fiction. The first step is employing people who are "detached" from the security environment of the target. This will ensure that the Red Team identifies true gaps in security, and not just easy fixes. Furthermore, the Red Team must recognize that terrorists are not simply crazy killers, but rational thinkers who plan, recon, train, and have the ability to successfully execute complicated operations. The article highlights 8 steps that the Red Team must analyze to successfully emulate a terrorist attack:

1. Target identification.

2. Intelligence acquisition (open source and social engineering).

3. Target surveillance to confirm or refute the intelligence.

4. Assessment of target attack plan.

5. Assessment of resource and tooling acquisition.

6. Rehearsal or training of the attack, including traveling to an unfamiliar environment and blending in with the target's surroundings.

7. The execution and its desired impact.

8. Planning and testing of the escape route.

The Red Team should always remember that terrorists will usually look for minimal exposure and contact with security; "the optimal attack is the one with the fewest obstacles." By making the Red Team assessment as realistic as possible, it will provide the most use in mitigating future threats. Furthermore, Red Teaming is not a one time exercise, but should be constantly applied to assess threats. "Red team assessments should serve as the starting point for implementing new or refining existing security practices. As practices are refined, additional red teaming evaluations should be utilized to continue this process and to address new threats or methodologies. Red teaming should be a continuing process with fresh eyes brought to bear on each evaluation (new eyes, new creative solutions)."

Homeland Security Employs Imagination

Washington Post, 18 June 2004

Summary:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed a special program designed to think creatively as to how terrorists may attack the US. Known as the Analytic Red Cell office, DHS sought out various professionals to form a "Red Team" that would serve to "think outside the box" as to new ways we may be targeted by terrorists. Various team members were "futurists, philosophers, software programmers, a pop musician and a thriller writer"

According to the article, "Typically the Red Cell team assembles 20 or so participants for a day-long session at leased offices in the Washington area. Each session divides into smaller groups and takes up a different question, such as: If you were a terrorist, how would you target the G-8 economic summit, held last week in Georgia? Another recent topic was: Why haven't terrorists hit the United States since Sept. 11, 2001?" After the Red Cell comes to its conclusions, the final reports are forwarded to intelligence analysts throughout the Intelligence Community (IC), who vet the results and compare them to actual threats and information. "Most Red Cell reports note they are 'alternative assessments intended to provoke thought and stimulate discussion'."

This technique is not new to the IC; the CIA and Pentagon have used the method since the Cold War to expand their thinking on on how the Soviets and other foreign militaries may attack the US. The reasoning behind the method is to get non-intelligence professionals to tackle intelligence related issues. According to Brad Meltzer, a thriller writer, when he was appraoched, "They said, 'We want people who think differently from the ones we have on staff.' "