Terrorism & Game Theory

Todd Sandler and Daniel G. Arce M., Simulation Gaming 2003; 34; 319

Summary:
The authors postulate that game theory is a useful tool to analyze both the actions of terrorists and a government's response to terrorism. Terrorists respond to how governments respond to them, and vice versa; thus by using game theory to study terrorism, the analyst may be able to come to some conclusions as to which actions are appropriate for a government to take to mitigate the threat of terrorism.

The article highlights 6 reasons why game theory is appropriate to the study of terrorism:

1. Game theory captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and a targeted government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot be analyzed as though one side is passive.
2. Strategic interactions among rational actors, who are trying to act according to how they think their counterparts will act and react, characterize the interface among terrorists (hardliners vs. moderates) or among alternative targets (various governments).
3. In terrorist situations, each side issues threats and promises to gain a strategic advantage.
4. Terrorists and governments abide by the underlying rationality assumption of game theory, where a player maximizes a goal subject to constraints.
5. Game-theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations and terrorist campaign-induced negotiations over demands.
6. Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are not completely informed.

As an example of using game theory to re-assess a governments policy towards terrorism, the article investigates the usefulness of the "no-negotiation" policy. The logic of the no-negotiation policy is that terrorists will not take hostages if there is nothing to gain from the undertaking, i.e. a government will not concede to their demands. By using game theory to develop a model of this policy, however, it becomes quickly apparent that the policy is of little value in deterring terrorists. Terrorists may still perceive the taking of hostages as beneficial to them for a variety of reasons, "If a sufficiently important person is secured, then the government may regret its no-negotiation pledge because the expected costs of not capitulating may exceed that of capitulating...Even when the government's pledge not to negotiate is believed by the terrorists, a fanatical group may still engage in a hostage mission when a positive payoff is associated with either a logistical or negotiation failure by advertising the cause or achieving martyrdom...The effectiveness of the no-negotiation policy hinges on the credibility of the government's pledge, the absence of incomplete information, the terrorists' gains being solely tied to a negotiation success, and sufficient deterrence spending to eliminate logistical success."

Game theory also exposes a paradox in the cooperation of governments in response to terrorism. "Although the US is the target of approximately 40% of all transnational terrorist attacks, virtually all of these attacks occurred abroad in recent years [prior to 2003], with 9/11 being a noticeable exception. US over deterrence means that it experiences attacks where it has little authority to do anything about them." Also highlighted is the seemingly contradictory effect that as nations share intelligence on terrorists to increase deterrence, they in fact "transfer the attacks abroad." By not sharing intelligence AND coordinating deterrence, nations "waste resources without necessarily increasing security."

Ultimately, game theory exposes flaws in policies that may not deter terrorist attacks as well as initially perceived By addressing these flaws, decision-makers can make their respective counterterrorism policies more effective.

Authors Comment: This article recommends game theory as a tool to reassess policy, which is not the role of the intelligence analyst. However, by using game theory in tandem with a knowledge of our own policies towards terrorism, the intelligence analyst may be able to better forecast where an attack is likely to occur (whether at home or abroad), the modus operandi of the attack, and perhaps what terrorists are trying to achieve. According to game theory, terrorists will always seek the highest payoffs for them, and thus the analyst can seek to identify these payoffs, how they are likely to be achieved, and inform the decision maker as to how to best prevent their achievement.

Red Teaming Revisited

Homeland Security Weekly

Summary:
This article takes a look at Red Teaming from the perspective of countering terrorism. According to Homeland Security Weekly, "It takes a thief to catch a thief. This is the Red Team Philosophy." There is a fine line, however, between creating a realistic scenario of value to the Intelligence Community (IC) and writing science fiction. The first step is employing people who are "detached" from the security environment of the target. This will ensure that the Red Team identifies true gaps in security, and not just easy fixes. Furthermore, the Red Team must recognize that terrorists are not simply crazy killers, but rational thinkers who plan, recon, train, and have the ability to successfully execute complicated operations. The article highlights 8 steps that the Red Team must analyze to successfully emulate a terrorist attack:

1. Target identification.

2. Intelligence acquisition (open source and social engineering).

3. Target surveillance to confirm or refute the intelligence.

4. Assessment of target attack plan.

5. Assessment of resource and tooling acquisition.

6. Rehearsal or training of the attack, including traveling to an unfamiliar environment and blending in with the target's surroundings.

7. The execution and its desired impact.

8. Planning and testing of the escape route.

The Red Team should always remember that terrorists will usually look for minimal exposure and contact with security; "the optimal attack is the one with the fewest obstacles." By making the Red Team assessment as realistic as possible, it will provide the most use in mitigating future threats. Furthermore, Red Teaming is not a one time exercise, but should be constantly applied to assess threats. "Red team assessments should serve as the starting point for implementing new or refining existing security practices. As practices are refined, additional red teaming evaluations should be utilized to continue this process and to address new threats or methodologies. Red teaming should be a continuing process with fresh eyes brought to bear on each evaluation (new eyes, new creative solutions)."

Homeland Security Employs Imagination

Washington Post, 18 June 2004

Summary:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed a special program designed to think creatively as to how terrorists may attack the US. Known as the Analytic Red Cell office, DHS sought out various professionals to form a "Red Team" that would serve to "think outside the box" as to new ways we may be targeted by terrorists. Various team members were "futurists, philosophers, software programmers, a pop musician and a thriller writer"

According to the article, "Typically the Red Cell team assembles 20 or so participants for a day-long session at leased offices in the Washington area. Each session divides into smaller groups and takes up a different question, such as: If you were a terrorist, how would you target the G-8 economic summit, held last week in Georgia? Another recent topic was: Why haven't terrorists hit the United States since Sept. 11, 2001?" After the Red Cell comes to its conclusions, the final reports are forwarded to intelligence analysts throughout the Intelligence Community (IC), who vet the results and compare them to actual threats and information. "Most Red Cell reports note they are 'alternative assessments intended to provoke thought and stimulate discussion'."

This technique is not new to the IC; the CIA and Pentagon have used the method since the Cold War to expand their thinking on on how the Soviets and other foreign militaries may attack the US. The reasoning behind the method is to get non-intelligence professionals to tackle intelligence related issues. According to Brad Meltzer, a thriller writer, when he was appraoched, "They said, 'We want people who think differently from the ones we have on staff.' "

Risk Based Methodology For Scenario Tracking, Intelligence Gathering, and Analysis For Countering Terrorism

Horowitz, Barry M. and Haimes, Yacov Y.. Systems Engineering, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2003, p. 152-169, 17 p.

Summary:
The authors of the paper apply a variety of methods to the problem of countering terrorism. One of the methods they apply is the use of Multiple-Objective Decision Trees (MODT). The use of MODT allows the intelligence community to make informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The authors propose using the method as the final step in a process that utilizes other methodologies, such as Bayesian analysis. "Finally, a decision-making mechanism is needed that can utilize the added knowledge derived from newly-discovered intelligence and make use of Bayesian analysis. In particular, the noncommensurate objectives—effort (cost and time) and risk—must be addressed in the multiobjective tradeoff analysis. Follow-up actions could vary from calling for special new information, to calling in experts to further evaluate the data, to initiating interception of the anticipated terrorist activity."

The authors state that the problem with traditional decision trees as applied to intelligence analysis is that the problem of the intelligence analyst is often too broad to be effectively represented by a decision tree. "In particular, an optimum derived from a single-
objective mathematical model, including that derived from a decision tree, often may be far from
representing reality, and thereby may mislead analysts as well as decision-makers." Instead, the authors propose MODTs as a effective methodology to assess decision making when their are multiple objectives, such as countering terrorism (thwart a plot, interdict the terrorists, dismantle their finances, kill the terrorists, etc.). Through the use of the MODT, decision makers and analysts begin with all objectives formulated, and then make trade-offs based on which set of decisions is most desirable for the given situation.

Comment: This paper further demonstrates the mathematical equations of MODT as opposed to traditional single objective decision trees. I did not include the equations in this summary, please see the article for the mathematics behind the methodology, as well as introductions to other methodologies that the authors propose to better your counterterrorism analysis.