Summary
Red
teaming is an extremely delicate method of analysis which requires at the
outset the adherence of six principles as researched by Micah Zenko in the
first chapter of his book, “Red Teaming: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the
Enemy.” Micah Zenko is a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations who
focuses most of his research on conflict prevention, US national security
policy, military planning and operations, and nuclear weapons policy. He wrote
this book to fulfill a lacunae of research in the pursuance of an
authoritatively centralized body of research on red team analysis.
He
finds after surveying industry practitioners, military leadership, intelligence
community professionals, and a variety of other sources that for any red team
to succeed, 1.) the boss must buy in. 2.) The team needs to be outside and
objective, while inside and aware. 3.) The team requires fearless skeptics who
utilize finesses. 4.) The analysts who fill the analytic positions of a red
team need to have a “big bag of tricks.” 5.) The consumer of the red teamed
analysis needs to be willing to hear bad news and act on it. 6.) Finally, the
team just needs to red team enough, but no more.
Findings
Per
each principle a brief description is necessary to understand the extent of the
red team ability:
1.) The Boss Must Buy In: In this phase for
any red team to be successful the “boss” has to buy into what the analytic team
is doing so that they have the “top cover” needed to remain effective. This
goes insofar as to say that the boss needs to set up enabling conditions in the
support of their employees to build contrarian and otherwise alternative forms
of analysis.
2.) Outside and
Objective, While Inside and Aware: It is critical that a red cell
understands the structure, scope, and sensitivity of the problem they are
working and in addition, “must avoid becoming institutionally captured, while
also making a sustained contribution to that institutions core mission.” This
is to say a red team must synchronize within the institution that it services,
but not bound to the same bureaucracy.
Further, this process if done right, “should not result in inadvertent
disruption or damage,” but rather probe an analysis or system for errors.
Although many times red team analysis cause disruption.
3.) Fearless Skeptics
with Finesse:
Red teams need to consist of people that are capable enough to be versed as
both “critical” and “divergent” thinkers. In many cases, red teamers also need
to be able to slip past cognitive bias and view themselves in a light as free
of bias as possible. Although still difficult as analysts collectively exhibit “existence
bias” or the natural tendency to believe something is good or morally just
because it exists. To be real about a situation, many red teamers have also
experienced at some point in their career “systemic failures” which help them
think up future failures.
4.) Have a Big Bag of
Tricks: The red team
analyst is one who cannot become entrenched in routine and easily anticipated.
Conversely, the analyst needs to be eclectic and broad-minded. Further, the
analyst needs to possess flexibility and adaptability to apply to different
situations to achieve traction and uniqueness. This is a constantly updating
principle as analysts continue to assimilate technology into their ability assist
in new analyses.
5.) Be Willing to Hear
Bad News and Act on It: The efforts of the red team should not be presented to
a consumer and then sit on a shelf. If that is the case, nothing has been done
to mitigate the findings of the red team and their analysis has not been taken
seriously. This many times is not the fault of the red team; it is the institutions
inability to accept the “potentially bad news” which could cost the
organization some kind of material gains. Bottom line, the commissioning
institution has to follow through with the information which is supplied in one
fashion or another.
6.) Red Team Just
Enough, But No More: The use of red
teaming capabilities needs to be calibrated to the needs of the organization.
The red team analysts should not red team for the sake of “red teaming” rather,
they should aim to resolve an initial problem that they were initial tasked
with figuring out from its start to its conclusion. Additionally, “a red team
can warn senior decision-makers about blind spots or unforeseen challenges that
they need to focus on immediately.” Red teams also need to be cognizant of the
overall ramifications of the fallout and calibration needed to accept the
answers they provide to the organization.
Critique
Zenko
presents effectively and clearly the overall prescriptions of how to use a red
team appropriately. The book although highly authoritative is hard to just pick
up and glean tactics and abilities from. Taking the book and condensing it into
a concise user manual may provide decision makers and red teamers alike a
framework to understand the partnership they are engaging in a bit more
clearly. Overall, great source.
Source
Tom,
ReplyDeleteWell done outlining this article into an easily comprehensible format. I am still a little unclear as to the last parameter about red teaming just enough but no more. Did the author go into detail explaining why organizations should utilize red team analysis only in certain circumstances? It seems to me if this is an effective method for producing nuanced analysis or at the very least alternative views of a problem, it should be utilized as often as possible. It just seems like the reason it isn't recommended for use all the time is because it can potentially hurt feelings or force DMs to act on potential problems. Neither of those are legitimate reasons to not conduct an analysis in my opinion.
Eric, thank you for your comments!
ReplyDeleteTo answer your question about "Red Team Just Enough, No More," the author makes it clear that to keep the red teams' analysis current it has to be presented in a timely fashion. Organizations are dynamic and if the information/analysis does not make to them in time then all the red teaming in the world would have not made a difference.
He also goes on to state that many tasks are started without an end date in sight. Therefore, without a timeline on the horizon the red team can become complacent and atrophy without the pressures of deadlines.
In the end, the two most important aspects of red teaming is that its analysis provides DMs the information they need to make "concrete changes in the strategies, plans, or procedures," and second, letting know the red team know how they affected the organization so the proper prescriptives can be handled/modeled.
Tom, I like how Zenko presents criteria for successful red teaming that can be used in any situation. It seems like a lot of the literature focuses on specific circumstances for red-teaming, such as for military operations. Did Zenko reveal any real-life examples of successful red-teaming?
ReplyDeleteI came across this guy in several articles and videos and it appears he knows what he is on about. He has a lot of research on Red Teaming under is belt and it has all been well received. Not sure how he is for readability, but the best are sometimes a little tough to get through. Good choice here, Tom.
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