Summary:
This article
written by Kenneth Watman, the Chairman of the War Gaming Department for the
Naval War College espouses his beliefs in the effectiveness of war gaming as an
analytic methodology. Surprisingly, his opinion is that war gaming by itself is
not an effective method for predictive analytics. He begins his article by
comparing war gaming to producing a theatrical play. A play, Watman says, is
only a representation of specific aspects of life. When creating a play, the
author must first decide what to focus the extent of the details on to get
his/her point across to the audience. It is impossible to show everything in as
great of detail as real life given the constrictions of time and space. Therefore,
a play is a form of model which seeks to represent something in real life of
interest to the creator. In war gaming, the creator must similarly choose what
to portray in detail, what to represent in a more thematic practice, and what
to omit. He furthers this analogy by cautioning any war gaming participants of
the importance of understanding that a war game is only a depiction of
specifically chosen details intended to analyze certain outcomes. For those
actors in the war game scenario who complain of not being able to smell
gunpowder or see real explosions, they are missing the point and ultimately
detracting from the exercise. Watman continues with the notion that the
iterative relationship between the “red teams” and “blue teams” which make up
traditional war game scenarios are the features that distinguish war gaming
from simply being an organized discussion, seminar, or workshop.
The primary benefit
of war gaming as identified by Watman is that it allows participants and
decision makers to develop a familiarity with problems and the choices they
contain so that when the real thing happens, they have a knowledge bank of experience
from which to draw. These types of exercises, regardless of the domain (i.e.
military, law enforcement, business, etc.) allow participants to predict the
behavior of adversarial forces, even if only slightly. This ability is
extremely important in terms of utilizing ones staffing and resources to
counter this threat. Watman writes that war games are effective means of
predicting potential outcomes, but suggests they are most useful for suggesting
questions, issues, and providing insights that must be analyzed more thoroughly
with other methods. War gaming alone is inefficient for effective predicative analysis.
In order for
a scientific experiment to be deemed acceptable to the academic community,
repetition and control over the variables are necessary. In war gaming, this is
not possible. Even if the same individuals were chosen to complete the
exercises multiple times (almost impossible to do by the way), their experiences,
behaviors, and moods would always be different resulting in various outcomes.
Not to mention that war gaming exercises typically require large time and
monetary commitments from creators and participants. Watman warns of the
dangers of participants falling under the impressions that they are now more
informed about what will happen because they participated in a war gaming
exercise. These exercises are designed to give participants experience in
potential outcomes to allow them to practice their responses. Simply participating
does not make one “all-knowing” as to the number of scenarios that can play out
in the future. Also, war gaming can lead to participants building up incorrect preconceived
notions about an opponent based on war gaming exercises. The results of which
can lead to underestimation of an opponent’s abilities or an overestimation in
one’s own abilities to counter.
Watman
concludes by agreeing that war gaming is a useful tool for saving the time and
money of the experimentation program. He believes that constituted correctly,
war games can replace much of the need for experiments themselves. But in order
for this to happen, these games must be carefully conceived and coupled to the
actual field experiments. These games, like their accompanying experiments,
must be detail oriented from the lowest level up. Only then can war game
scenarios be compared to experiments to reveal their accuracy at predicting
outcomes.
Critique:
Although
Watman’s article did slant toward the military side in terms of some of the
analogies and terms used throughout, I found this article particularly
interesting and useful for other domains. Most notably, that as the Chairman
for the War Gaming Naval College, Watman is not afraid to profess his worries
of people utilizing war gaming as their singular means of predictive analysis.
He comes right out and says it is basically a modifier to generate new ways of
thinking which other methods would be better suited to answer. This
understanding of how war gaming was used in the past and how it should be used
in the future speaks to all disciplines interested in conducting war gaming
exercises, not just the military. This article very clearly laid out the
authors opinions on the benefits and drawbacks of war gaming in an easy to
comprehend manner which personally expanded my understanding of the subject. Through
my own limited experiences with military experiments (field exercises) and war
games (computer simulations), I agree with Watman’s assessment that the war
games must be as closely tied in detail to the experiments as possible in order
for them to be anywhere near accurate at predicting outcomes. I also agree with
his assessment that war gaming is primarily beneficial to participants by
allowing them to practice their “battle drills” so if/when a similar scenario
plays out in the future, they have a reference to what they did in the exercise
and if it worked and why.
Source:
Watman, K. (2003). War gaming and its
role in examining the future. Brown J. World Aff., 10, 51.
Eric, I liked your comment about wargaming not having to involve real explosions or smell real gunpowder. I feel that wargaming is very beneficial due to its similarity to those real situations and the preparedness it brings to either a team or individual person.
ReplyDeleteCharles, you wouldn't believe the number of times my unit would be out conducting predeployment training at Fort Campbell or JRTC at Fort Polk and have soldiers whining about the "realness" of training. They deprive themselves of much of the benefit of the training when they spend most of their energy picking it apart and complaining. Of course my NCOs had a multitude of creative ways to make these individuals feel more immersed in the experience. lol
DeleteEric, did Watman specify that wargaming only involves a "red team" and a "blue team"? I'm just curious since the author of my article specifies that business wargaming typically consists of four teams, and I am wondering if there are different processes depending on the discipline.
ReplyDeleteAubrey, Good question. Watman does not say that wargaming can only be done with a red or a blue team. He just said that is how he has seen it predominately performed in his experience. Which makes sense coming from a military background where it's usually a "us v. them" mentality where a specific threat is identified as the topic of the wargaming. I would imagine there are a number of ways one can conduct wargaming that do not include two teams pitted against each other; especially in other disciplines like business.
DeleteEric, I got the same impression concerning the method versus modifier status of war gaming. However, do you think there ever could be a situation were war gaming could be a method and not a modifier?
ReplyDeleteRuark, Thats a good question. I would have to side with Watson on this one in that I'd be hesitant to claim my side is fully prepared to engage the "enemy", whatever form that may be, simply because one or a number of simulations have been run. I agree with Watson in that war games can be beneficial for allowing participants to see potential outcomes, but not every possible outcome. I would want to double down so to speak and use other methods if time and circumstances permit.
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